Andrews Reath
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1984
Professor of Philosophy
HMNSS 3218
951-827-1503 (message phone)
andrews.reath@ucr.edu
Professor Reath
works in the area of moral philosophy, in particular Kant’s practical
philosophy, with additional interests in the history of moral philosophy. His
work on Kant has focused on his moral psychology, his conception of autonomy,
and the foundational arguments in the Groundwork and the Critique
of Practical Reason. In 2006 he
published a collection of essays on these topics, Agency
and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford). He has also co-edited (with Jens Timmermann) a collection of new essays on the Critique of Practical Reason—Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge 2010). Current projects
include attempts to understand the sense in which Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a formal principle, Kant’s
account of free agency, his general conception of rational agency, and a short book on the
argument of the Groundwork.
Books:
- Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford university Press, 2006)—a collection of 7 previously published essays and 2 previously unpublished essays, “Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality” and “Agency and Universal Law.”
Edited Books:
- Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, eds. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- A. Reath, B. Herman & C. M. Korsgaard, eds., Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Selected Articles (some of which are linked as a pdf):
- “Formal Approaches to Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” in Sorin Baiasu and Mark Timmons, eds., Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- “Formal Principles and the Form of a Law,” in Reath and Timmermann, eds., A Critical Guide to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- “Contemporary Kantian Ethics,” in John Skorupski, ed., The Routledge Companion to Ethics (Routledge Press, 2010).
- “Setting Ends Through Reason,” in Simon Robertson, ed., Spheres of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2009): 199–219.
- “Autonomy, Taking One’s Choices to be Good, and Practical Law: Replies to Critics,” Philosophical Books 49, No. 2 (April 2008): 125–137.
- “Kant’s Critical Account of Freedom,” in Graham Bird, ed., A Companion to Kant (Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 275–290.
- “Value and Law in Kant’s Moral Theory,” Ethics 114, No. 3 (October 2003): 127–155.
- “Duties to Oneself and Self-Legislation,” in Mark Timmons, ed., Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays (Oxford University Press, 2001): 349–370. Reprinted in Agency and Autonomy.
- “Introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason,” in Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. M. J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- “Legislating for a Realm of Ends: the Social Dimensions of Autonomy,” in A. Reath, B. Herman & C.M. Korsgaard, Reclaiming the History of Ethics, 1997. Reprinted in Agency and Autonomy.
- “Legislating the Moral Law,” Noûs, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1994. Reprinted in Agency and Autonomy.
- “Intelligible Character and the Reciprocity Thesis,” Inquiry, Vol. 36, 1993.
- “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant”s Principle of Happiness,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1989. Reprinted in Agency and Autonomy.
- “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility,” Kant-Studien, Vol. 80, No. 3, 1989. Reprinted in Agency and Autonomy.
- “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 26, 1988.