Charles SiewertCharles Siewert

Ph.D., UC Berkeley, 1994
Professor of Philosophy
HMNSS 3217
951-827-1503 (message phone)
charles.siewert@ucr.edu

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Note: Links to selected papers can be found below.

Research Statement

In The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton University Press, 1998) I defend a role for self-critical first-person reflection in philosophical inquiry, and rely on this in arguing for an interpretation of the notion of phenomenal consciousness. I make the case that phenomenal consciousness so understood is inseparable from the intentionality of sense experience and thought, though it is not to be reductively explained as a form of mental representation. And I argue that it has a deep intrinsic value that makes especially compelling the need to do it theoretical justice. 

I have continued to work on these and related ideas, publishing articles on issues such as: the nature of “first-person warrant” for judgments about experience; the relation between self-knowledge and rationality; the “grand illusion hypothesis” and the richness (or poverty) of visual experience; the “transparency” of consciousness and the feasibility of attending to one’s own experience; perceptual constancy, sensory attention and the notion of sensorimotor intentionality; and the legitimacy of a phenomenological approach to understanding the mind.

I am planning a book that draws together and extends this work, provisionally entitled Respecting Appearances. In it I would also like it to tackle questions about: the distinction between the senses and the intellect; what’s right and what’s wrong in the notion of “inner perception” as a source of self-knowledge; and the value and perils of self-consciousness in its various forms.

My work on Plato has focused most on a reconstruction of the Republic argument for the tripartite division of the soul and the view of human motivation implicit in it. I have published one paper on the division between reason and appetite, and am writing a second explaining the case for recognizing the third part, “spirit.” My hope is that this and other work in Ancient Philosophy will integrate more fully with my general interest in consciousness, by contributing to a view of how desire is variously manifest in experience, and of how one’s knowledge of oneself, and one’s psychological unity, are both to be regarded as achievements, not as givens.

 Publications

Book:

  • The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press, 1998.

Articles (linked titles below point to pdf articles):

  • “Intellectualism, Experience and Motor Understanding” (forthcoming in Myth of the Mental?, edited by J. Schear, Routledge).
  • “Phenomenal Thought” (forthcoming in Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by T. Bayne and M. Montague, Oxford University Press).
  • “Embodied Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap” (forthcoming in Psyche symposium on E. Thompson’s Mind in Life).
  • “Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience” (forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies symposium on E. Schwitzgebel’s and R. Hurlburt’s Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic).
  • “Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists,” in The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
  • “Consciousness and Conceptual Thought,” in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
  • “Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLV, Supplement (2007).
  • “In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Special Issue on Dennett and Heterophenomenology, Vol. 6 Nos.1-2 March 2007.
  • “Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?,” Psyche 12 (3) July 2006.
  • “Consciousness,” in A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall. Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
  • “Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality,” in Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by David Smith and Amie Thomasson. Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • “Plain Phenomenology,” in Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Edited by Maria Reicher and Johann Marek.  Öbv & Hpt Velagsgesellschaft, 2005.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?” Philosophical Studies, 117: 15-41, 2004.
  • “Rationality and Self-Knowledge: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness,” in Privileged Access. Edited by Brie Gertler. Ashegate, 2003.
  • “Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor?,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue: “Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?”,  Vol. 9, No. 5-6, 2002.
  • “Consciousness and Intentionality,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, June 2002 (revised December 2006).
  • “Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity,” Noûs, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 2001.
  • “Plato’s Division of Reason and Appetite,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2001.
  • Articles for a symposium on The Significance of Consciousness in the on-line journal Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness:
    • “Consciousness, Natural Representation, and First-Person Warrant: Reply to Dretske,” Psyche 10 (03), November 2004.
    • “Phenomenality and Intentionality: Which Explains Which? Reply to Gertler,” Psyche 10 (02), October 2004.
    • “Consciousness, Intentionality, and Concepts: Reply to Nelkin,” Psyche 10 (02), September 2004.
    • “First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: Reply to Witmer,” Psyche 9(06), February 2003.
    • “Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge, and Phenomenal Intentionality: Reply to Levine,” Psyche 9(03) January 2003.
    • “Phenomenality, Intentionality, and Reflexivity: Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson,” Psyche 8(09) October 2002.
    •  “Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: Reply to Lycan,” Psyche, 7 (07) April 2001.
    • “Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: Reply to Carruthers,” Psyche, 7 (07) April 2001.
    • “Précis of The Significance of Consciousness,” Psyche 6 (12) October 2000.

Reviews

  • “Review of Dan Zahavi’s Subjectivity and Selfhood,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
  • “Review of Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life, Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews (ndpr.nd.edu), January 2008.
  • “Review of Galen Strawson’s Mental Reality,” Philosophical Psychology  9: 404-408, Sept.1996.
  • “What Dennett Can’t Imagine and Why,” Inquiry 36: 96-112, March 1993. 

In Preparation:

Presentations

  • Comments on Richard Swinburne’s presentation, “Substance Dualism,” at UC Riverside, meeting of SCP, October 2008.
  • “Consciousness and Curiosity,” presented at the University of Arizona, October 2008.
  • “The Question of Phenomenal Thought” presented at “Consciousness and Thought” conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, August 2008.
  • “The Charge of Intellectualism: Dreyfus, McDowell and Merleau-Ponty,” presented at the Asilomar Conference for the  International Society for Phenomenological Studies, Monterey, CA, July 2008.
  • “The Question of Phenomenal Thought” presented at the Workshop on Phenomenology and Intentionality, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, June 2008.
  • Comments on John Campbell’s “Practical vs Reflective Ways of Understanding Causation,” presented at the Conference on the Self, Agency, and Self-Awareness,” University of California, Riverside, February 2008.
  • “The Question of Phenomenal Thought” presented at the Meeting of the California Phenomenology Circle, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, June 2007.
  • “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Regress Challenge,” presented at Workshop on Phenomenology and Intentionality, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, April 2007.
  • “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness,” presented at the Pacific APA meeting of the California Phenomenology Circle, April 2007.
  • “Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?” presented at the Spindel Conference on the First-Person Perspective in Philosophical Inquiry, University of Memphis, Sept. 2006.
  • “On Perceptual Constancy and Sensorimotor Skill,” presented at Asilomar Conference for the  International Society for Phenomenological Studies, Monterey, CA, July 2006.
  • “Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?,” presented at Pomona College, on March 2006.
  • Reply to John Campbell’s Comments on “In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology,” presented at the SPAWN Conference on Consciousness at Syracuse University, Syracuse NY, on July 30, 2005.
  • “In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology,” presented at the University of California Irvine, May 23, 2005.
  • “In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology,” presented at a meeting of the California Phenomenology Group, Los Angeles, CA, May 21, 2005.
  • “In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology,” presented at the meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 26, 2005.
  • “Plain Phenomenology,” presented at California State University Los Angeles, March 3, 2005.
  • “Plain Phenomenology,” presented at the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria, August 10, 2004.
  • “Comments on Van Gulick’s ‘Jackson’s Change of Mind: Representationalism, A Priorism and the Knowledge Argument,’” presented at La Pietra Conference, Florence, Italy, June 23, 2004.
  • “Minimal Phenomenology,” presented to the Society for the Study of Husserl’s Philosophy, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April 24, 2004.
  • “Attention and Higher Order Representation,” presented at East Carolina University Philosophy Conference, Greenville, North Carolina, April 2, 2004.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?,” presented at the University of California, Riverside, CA, January 13, 2004.
  • Workshop on The Significance of Consciousness, at the University of Munich, Munich, Germany, December 13, 2003.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?,” presented at the University of Munich, Munich, Germany, December 12, 2003.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?,” presented at the University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland, December 11, 2003.
  • “Consciousness and Higher Order Representation,” presented at the University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland, December 11, 2003.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?”, presented at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, May 21, 2003.
  • “Is Experience Transparent?”, presented at the Institute for Subjectivity Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 15, 2003.
  • “Attention and Inner Sense,” presented at the Institute for Subjectivity Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 13, 2003.
  • “Attending to Experience,” presented at Pacific meeting of the American Philosophical Association, March 27, 2003.
  • “Phenomenal Thought,” presented at NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Californian Santa Cruz, July 9, 2002.
  • “Is Vision Rich or Poor?” presented at the Tuscon Conference,“Toward a Science of Consciousness,” April 11, 2002.
  • Author Meets Critics: The Significance of Consciousness, with replies to Glen Braddock and Joseph Levine, Pacific APA Meeting, March 30, 2002.