Gary WatsonGary Watson

Ph.D., Princeton University, 1972
Professor of Philosophy
HMNSS 3209
951-827-3103
gary.watson@ucr.edu

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Professor Watson works in Moral and Political Philosophy, with a special focus on moral psychology and theory of agency. A number of his essays on freedom and responsibility have been collected in his Agency and Answerability (Oxford University Press, 2004). He is also editor of Free Will (second edition, Oxford University Press, 2003). In addition, he has published on contractualism, theory of virtue, promising, and Kant’s ethics, and he maintains an active research and teaching interest in criminal law and in philosophical issues in race and gender. He is an Advisory Editor for the journal, Philosophy and Public Affairs. Professor Watson joined the Philosophy Department in 1999.

Research Interests:

  • Philosophy of Mind

  • Moral Psychology

  • Human Agency

  • Free Will and Moral Responsibility (including Virtue and Character)

Research Themes:

Since graduate school, my interests have centered around issues in philosophy of mind and moral philosophy that arise from human agency. This interest is reflected not only in my writings on free will and moral responsibility, but also (less obviously) in some work on virtue and character. I also teach and think about political philosophy (esp. liberalism), philosophical issues in race and gender, and Nietzsche.

Selected Publications:

  • Books and Collections:
    • Free Will, G. Watson, ed., Oxford University Press, 1982.

  • Recent Articles:
    • "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, April 24, 1975, pp. 205-20. (i) reprinted in (6) below. (ii) reprinted in Moral Responsibility, ed. John M. Fischer, Cornell University Press, 1989. (iii) reprinted in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. by John Christman, Oxford University Press, 1989.

    • "Skepticism about Weakness of Will," The Philosophical Review, July, 1977, pp. 316-39. Reprinted in Moral Theory, ed. George Sher, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1986.

    • Review of Anthony Kenny's Will, Freedom and Power, Journal of Philosophy, April, 1978, pp. 209-17.

    • Abstract of "Appropriate Emotions," Journal of Philosophy, November, 1978.

    • Introductory Essay to Free Will, G. Watson, ed., pp. 1-14 (see #6 below).

    • Review of Jennifer Hornsby's Actions, Journal of Philosophy, August, 1982, pp. 464-69.

    • Review of James Wallace's Virtues and Vices, Topoi, December, 1982, pp. 58-60.

    • "Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life," Philosophy Research Archives, 1983, pp. 79-108.

    • "Virtues in Excess," Philosophical Studies, July, 1984.

    • Review of Robert Richman's God, Free Will and Morality, Canadian Philosophical Reviews, May/June, 1985, pp. 213-18.

    • "Animals, Ethics and Agriculture," The Trumpeter, Summer, 1985, pp. 17-20.

    • "Introduction" (with G. Santas), Topoi, March, 1985, pp. 1-2.

    • Review of Daniel Dennett's Elbow Room, Journal of Philosophy, September, 1986, pp. 517-22.

    • "Skepticism and Free Will" (a critical discussion of Peter van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March, 1986, pp. 507-22.

    • "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil," in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. F. Schoeman, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 256-86. Reprinted in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, eds. J.M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Cornell University Press, 1993.

    • "Free Action and Free Will," Mind, April, 1987, pp. 145-172.

    • "The Primacy of Character," in Identity, Character, and Morality, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty, M.I.T. Press, 1990. Reprinted in Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Statman, Paragon Press (New York), forthcoming.

    • Review of Susan Wolf's Freedom within Reason, Philosophical Review, 1992.

    • "Free Will," in A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, Basil Blackwell, 1994.

    • "Albritton and Hoffman on Freedom and Strength of Will," Philosophical Studies, 77, 1995.

    • "Closing the Gap: Feinberg on Reformism," Arizona Law Review, 37, No.1, Spring, 1995.

    • "Two Notions of Accountability," Philosophical Topics, ed. Christopher Hill, Autumn, 1997.

    • "Some Considerations in Favor of Contractualism," in Rationality, Commitment, and Morality, a volume in honor of Gregory Kavka, eds. Christopher Morris and Jules Coleman, Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming.
Recent Colloquia and Presentations:
  • "The Primacy of Character," University of California, Riverside, November, 1989.

  • "The Primacy of Character," University of Washington, April, 1990.

  • Two Lectures: i)"The Considerable Charms of Contractualism"; 2)"Virtues and Outcomes," Western Washington University, October, 1990.

  • "Responsibility and Normative Competence," Pacific APA Symposium, March, 1992.

  • "Two Features of Responsibility," Princeton University, October, 1992.
  • Distinguished Visitor Seminar on Free Will: Pomona College, February, 1994.

  • "Hoffman and Albritton on Freedom and Strength of Will," APA meetings, Los Angeles, March, 1994.

  • Interdisciplinary Seminar on Criminal Responsibility, School of Law, The University of Chicago, June 17, 1994.

  • "Closing the Gap," paper presented at "Issues in The Philosophy of Law," Conference in Honor of Joel Feinberg, The University of Arizona, September 30, 1994.

  • "Two Faces of Responsibility," Stanford University, October 6, 1995.

  • "Assertion and Responsibility," Santa Clara Philosophy Conference on Moral Responsibility, February, 1997.

  • "Disordered Appetites," Russell Sage Workshop on Addiction, New York City, June, 1997.

  • "Soft Libertarianism, Hard Determinism," Conference:The Significance of Free Will, The University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, September, 1997.